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1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I shall argue that despite its current popularity the doctrine of the 
specious present, or at least every current version of it, should be rejected.1 In its place 
I propose two different accounts, which deal with experiences of two different kinds 
of change. The first is what I shall call the dynamic snapshot theory, which accounts for 
the way we experience continuous changes such as motion and other motion-like 
phenomena. The second account deals with the way we experience discontinuous 
changes, those for which there is no finite rate of change. In defending both accounts, 
but especially the latter, I shall argue that much of the current debate implicitly 
presupposes a problematic Cartesian view about the nature of conscious experience. If 
this view is rejected – as I think it should be – then a different kind of account 
emerges that avoids commitment both to the specious present and to its main current 
rival, the cinematic view. 
 
 
2. The Current Orthodoxy 
 
A significant majority of philosophers writing about temporal experience today accept 
one or another version of the doctrine of the specious present, according to which 
                                                
1 A more detailed account of the ideas presented in this chapter can be found in Prosser 2016: chapter 
5. 
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conscious experiences have temporally extended contents. That is to say, they hold 
that the experienced present consists not of an instant, but of an extended interval of 
time. The duration of this interval is usually taken to be small: around half a second, 
say. There are also those who, following James (1890), use the phrase “specious 
present” to denote a temporal interval of several seconds. In such cases, however, it 
usually turns out that what they have in mind is a kind of “psychological present” 
associated with short-term memory. I have nothing to say about the latter notion of 
the specious present; I shall be concerned only with the former. The question before 
us is whether, or in what sense, conscious perceptual experiences – experiences with a 
phenomenology, or “something that it is like” (in Nagel’s (1974) sense) – have a short 
but temporally extended content. 
There are two main versions of the doctrine which, following Dainton (2008, 
2010), I shall call the retentional and extensional models. Suppose the duration of the 
specious present is n seconds. According to the retentional model (Broad 1938; Lee 
2014), there is no reason to expect that the experience itself should occur over a 
period of n seconds; the experience need not be, and typically is not, extended to the 
same degree as its content. Traditionally, the experience itself was assumed to take 
place instantaneously; however Geoffrey Lee (2014) has made a strong case for the 
view that the experience itself may take some time to occur. Crucially, however, even 
on Lee’s “extended atomism” version of retentionalism, it is not the case that an 
experience of the short sequence A-B-C involves the subject experiencing A, then 
experiencing B, then experiencing C. Instead, there is a single experience of the 
sequence A-B-C. According to the extensional model (Foster 1979; Foster 1982: 
chapter 16; Foster 1991: 246-50; Dainton 2000; 2001; 2008; Hoerl 2009; 2013; 
Phillips 2010; 2011; 2014; Rashbrook 2013), by contrast, the temporal structure of 
the experience matches the temporal structure of its content. Thus if the content of 
the experience is an interval of time n seconds long, then the experience itself lasts n 
seconds. Moreover, most extensionalists also assume that the internal structure of the 
experience matches the structure of the experienced events; if the content of the 
specious present is the sequence A-B-C then the subject experiences A, then 
experiences B, then experiences C. 
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The most discussed competitor to the doctrine of the specious present is the 
cinematic model (defended by Chuard 2011. The name is used in Dainton 2010 and 
elsewhere.) According to the cinematic model, experience consists of a series of “static 
snapshot” experiences, the content of which is a single instant of time. Change, on 
this view, is experienced only indirectly, through the combination of a current 
experience with a very recent memory. 
 
 
3. Arguments for the Specious Present 
 
The literature on temporal experience contains surprisingly few direct arguments in 
favor of the specious present. The most common type of argument appeals to the fact 
that we can perceive change. As C. D. Broad observed, there is at least a strong prima 
facie case for thinking that we do perceive certain kinds of change, such as motion, 
rather than inferring them from a combination of immediate experience and episodic 
memory: 
 
…We do not merely notice that something has moved or otherwise changed; we 
also often see something moving or changing. This happens if we look at the 
second-hand of a watch or look at a flickering flame. These are experiences of a 
quite unique kind; we could no more describe what we sense in them to a man who 
had never had such experiences than we could describe a red colour to a man born 
blind. It is also clear that to see a second-hand moving is a quite different thing 
from “seeing” that an hour-hand has moved. In the one case we are concerned with 
something that happens within a single sensible field; in the other we are 
concerned with a comparison between the contents of two different sensible fields. 
(Broad 1923: 351) 
 
It does indeed seem that motion perception has a robust phenomenology; it involves a 
phenomenological element that is quite unlike anything that can be encountered in 
the perception of a static scene. Many philosophers have dismissed the Cinematic 
model, with its “static snapshot” content, as incapable of accounting for this 
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phenomenology, and have assumed that it can only be accounted for by some version 
of the doctrine of the specious present. The idea seems to be that because a single 
specious present would contain the moving object at different positions at different 
times, motion would be part of the content of the experience. 
Sometimes a more direct argument is given. This usually takes something like the 
following form. Motion, and indeed change of any other kind, essentially takes time. 
An experience whose content consisted in the state of the world at an instant could 
only have in its content that which could occur within the instant. It thus could not 
include anything essentially extended in time. Therefore, given that motion essentially 
takes time but can be perceived, the content of an experience cannot be an instant.2 
Similar arguments can be given by appealing to anything perceptible but essentially 
extended in time. Consider sounds, for example. There are differing views about what 
one is aware of when one hears a sound. Suppose, for present purposes, that when one 
hears a sound, the object of one’s experience is an objective entity such as a process or 
event – the fingernails scraping across the blackboard, the wind moving through the 
trees, the vibration of the violin string, and so on.3 It seems plausible that a process 
essentially takes time; there is no such thing as an instantaneous process. In that case, 
it might be argued, since the object of auditory experience is essentially temporally 
extended, auditory experience cannot have an instantaneous content. 
Arguments of this kind are not sound; they fail because they mistakenly assume 
that an experience with an instantaneous content can have, in its content, only that 
which could occur instantaneously. This is simply false, for extended processes 
nevertheless have instantaneous parts, even if the nature of such parts depends on 
what occurs at other times. All that can be concluded from such arguments is that the 
surrounding temporal context must be detected by the system that produces the 
experience. Rather than continue to address this point in the abstract, however, I shall 
illustrate it by sketching a theory, which I shall call the dynamic snapshot theory, that 
allows for motion to be perceived without recourse to the specious present. 
                                                
2 A clear example of this kind of argument is given by Grush (2007: 1), but similar arguments are 
encountered frequently. 
3 See Casati and Dokic 1994, Pasnau 2007 and O’Callaghan 2007 for theories of sound broadly of this 
kind. 
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One small concession must be made. Perception has a finite resolution, and this 
affects the degree to which experience can be said to have precisely one time as its 
content. By analogy, consider spatial perception. All else being equal, below a certain 
size, it is impossible to tell which of two very small objects is the smallest; all 
extremely small objects will look the same, at least insofar as they reflect or produce 
the same amount of light. This means that using vision alone it would be impossible 
to detect the difference between a point-sized object and a small but slightly extended 
one. Something similar is true of temporal experience: below a certain temporal 
extension, one cannot detect differences.4 It does not follow from this, however, that 
experience has a temporally extended content in any interesting sense. It follows only 
that it is indeterminate, to a small degree, which moment in time is the content of the 
experience. If the doctrine of the specious present is to account for the experience of 
change then it requires instead a duration long enough to include different, 
temporally discriminable states. 
 
 
4. The Dynamic Snapshot Theory 
 
Suppose that having a perceptual experience were like being aware of a kind of 
internal picture. If that picture were a snapshot of a single instant, it would contain no 
motion. Objects would be depicted as occupying a single locations in space; there 
would be no way to tell which objects were moving, or in what way. A photograph 
taken with an exposure time greater than zero would show objects as slightly blurred 
due to their motion, but if the picture really depicted a single instant then there would 
be no clues of this sort. In order to judge that there was motion, one would have to 
compare the picture with another picture taken at a different time, showing the 
objects in different places. 
But conscious experience is not at all like an awareness of an inner picture. To 
think of experience in that way would be to fall into a problematic Cartesian view of 
                                                
4 For vision the threshold for detecting distinct stimuli is 20 ms, for audition it is 2–3 ms, and for touch 
it is 10 ms (see Ruhnau 1995). See also Pockett 2003. In all sensory modalities there is the same 
threshold for the discrimination of temporal order: around 20–40 ms (Hirsh and Sherrick 1961, Pöppel 
1997). 
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the conscious mind. I shall say more about this in the final section, but for now note 
the obvious difficulty with the “inner picture” model: if perception of the external 
world involved awareness of an inner picture, an account would have to be given of 
this “awareness”. But this could not be accounted for in the same way as perceptual 
awareness of the external world, for an infinite regress of inner pictures would 
threaten. If it worked in some other way, however, then it is unclear why that account 
would not already explain awareness of the external world, removing the need for the 
inner picture. 
We can make better sense of experience by thinking in terms of the content of the 
experience. The content of an experience is what the experience is of. When you see a 
tree next to a hill, the content of your experience is that there is a tree next to a hill 
(along with your own perspective on the scene and whatever further details are 
perceived). Sometimes philosophers claim that experiences have representational 
contents. The main point of this is to allow that the experience could be falsidical; it 
could have the content that there is a tree next to a hill even if this were not the case. 
But for present purposes we can side-step the debate over whether experiences are 
representational by focusing on the veridical case, and using the word “content” as 
neutral with regard to the notion of representation (different theories of perception, 
such as naïve realism and intentionalism, will still say different things about falsidical 
cases). 
Now, the “inner picture” model makes it tempting to think that if the content of 
an experience concerned only a single time, it could not include motion. But, as Broad 
notes in the passage quoted above, “we also often see something moving or changing”. 
“Moving” is a state that something can be in at an instant, even though it can only be 
in that state by virtue of being in other places at other times. So the motion of an 
object, including its direction and rate, could be part of the content of an experience, 
even if the content of that experience concerned only what was the case at one specific 
time. Suppose that a perceived object, O, were moving with velocity v, where “v” is a 
vector (that is, it encodes both the rate and direction of motion). Then the content of 
the experience could be: O is moving with velocity v. A corresponding claim could be 
made for any other case in which there was an on-going process whose state could be 
specified by a vector at a single time, even if the existence of the state at that time was 
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metaphysically dependent on what was the case at other times. Cognitive scientists 
sometimes refer to all such continuous perceptible changes, such as the steady 
dimming of a light, the shifting of a color hue or the rise and fall in the pitch or 
volume of a sound, as “motion” (see Rensink 2002). I shall refer to them as continuous 
changes, or sometimes as motion-like changes.5 
It would, of course, take time for the brain to detect motion, for example by 
comparing patterns of retinal stimulation at different times. But it clearly does not 
follow from this that the resulting experience must have a temporally extended 
content. The necessary properties of the stimulus can differ from those of the 
resulting experience. 
I shall call the theory outlined above the dynamic snapshot theory.6 It is a “snapshot” 
theory because it accounts for the experience of motion without appeal to a specious 
present, but it is very different from the cinematic or “static snapshot” theory. I agree 
with those who hold that the latter theory cannot adequately account for the 
phenomenology of motion experience, or the experience of other motion-like changes. 
The dynamic snapshot theory gains some plausibility from various empirical 
sources. Perhaps one part of the intuition that snapshot experiences can only be static 
is connected with the idea that for there to be an experience of change, the content of 
one’s experience must itself change over time. But this appears to be false; there are 
many examples of motion illusions in which motion is experienced despite the fact 
that no part of the content of the experience changes (apart from the time itself). The 
best-known example is the waterfall illusion (Wohlgemuth 1911) in which, after a 
period of looking at steady motion such as motion of the water in a waterfall, when 
                                                
5 What about sounds? If the perceived object of auditory experience is an event or a process, as 
suggested above, could this be represented by a vector? I see no reason why not, though I have space 
only for a very limited explanation here. At any given moment the auditory signal can be represented 
by a frequency spectrum, representing the intensity at different wavelengths of sound at a given time. 
This corresponds to the frequency distribution of a perceived physical vibration (the sound source) at 
that time, and this could be represented by a vector. 
6 Something similar is briefly outlined by Robin Le Poidevin (2007: 88-92), who also makes a similar 
appeal to the waterfall illusion (see below). While writing this chapter, subsequent to completing 
Prosser 2016 (in which I also used the name ‘dynamic snapshot theory’), I discovered that Valtteri 
Arstila (2016) has also used the same name for a similar view (Arstila’s ambitions for the dynamic 
snapshot theory appear to be a little more extensive than mine; but he does not distinguish sharply 
between continuous and discontinuous change, so I’m not certain of his view regarding the latter. 
Arstila also has an interesting take on the much-discussed ‘postdiction’ phenomena.) I have also heard 
Bradford Skow suggest something similar to the dynamic snapshot theory in a talk in June 2015. 
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the subject looks at a stationary scene, the scene appears to move in the opposite 
direction to the motion that had been perceived. Yet subjects report that the positions 
of objects in the scene do not appear to change. There are many similar phenomena: 
see for example the “fine grain motion illusion” (Exner 1875, Thorson, Lange and 
Biederman-Thorson 1969), in which motion is experienced between points that are 
indistinguishably close together, or the phenomenon in which motion is observed in a 
two-frame sequence where one frame is below the threshold for pattern detection 
(Morgan and Cleary 1992). In all such cases motion is experienced even though 
relevant aspects of the content of the experience remain constant. If experience were 
anything like an encounter with an inner picture, such cases ought not to be possible. 
The standard explanation for the waterfall illusion appeals to neural adaptation 
that leads to a shift in the base activation level in populations of neurons that are 
associated with motion detection in early visual processing (see Anstis, Verstraten and 
Mather 1998). Due to this shift, the adapted neurons indicate motion in the absence 
of a moving stimulus. The suggestion is then that the brain processes information in a 
variety of different streams, each of which computes something different. The content 
of conscious experience comprises various different contents thus computed. 
Sometimes, due to neural adaptation, those processes produce the result that an object 
is moving, despite there being no variation over time in its independently computed 
location. 
Whether or not this is the correct explanation for the waterfall illusion, the very 
possibility of such an explanation illustrates the possibility that computational 
processes in the visual system could yield the content that the object is moving (with 
velocity v) at a specific time. 
According to the dynamic snapshot theory, what is experienced as happening at t is 
in no part constituted by what is experienced as happening at other times close to t. 
This conflicts with what is said by certain other theories (e.g. the extensional account 
defended by Phillips (2010; 2011; 2014), if I understand it correctly). But it does not 
follow that the dynamic snapshot theory entails the possibility a subject who 
experiences motion at t and has no experience as of any other times close to t. For all 
the dynamic snapshot theory says, there might be other reasons for denying such a 
possibility (see Prosser 2016: 148-154 for related discussion). 
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5. Discontinuous changes 
 
Although the dynamic snapshot theory gives a straightforward account of the 
experience of motion and other continuous changes, it cannot explain the experience 
of discontinuous changes. These are changes such that there is one state of affairs up 
to and including time t, but a different state of affairs at all times thereafter, and 
hence no finite rate of change between the states. An example would be a light that 
illuminated or changed color instantly, or at least quickly enough that the human 
visual system would not distinguish the change from one that was genuinely 
instantaneous. Suppose the light were red at all times up to and including t, and green 
at all times thereafter. There would be no time at which the change was taking place; 
the light would always be determinately one color or the other, and would never be in 
a state of transition between the two. (Perhaps no real light changes color 
instantaneously. But there are real lights that change color sufficiently quickly to be 
indistinguishable, to our limited visual systems, from a genuinely instantaneous 
change. See Prosser 2016: 128-9 for further discussion of this issue.) Consequently, if 
the content of experience included only a single instant of time, it would be 
impossible for the change of color to be part of the content of any experience. Yet 
there does seem to be some sense in which we can see a light instantly change color. 
One option at this point would be to regard discontinuous change as a 
counterexample to the dynamic snapshot theory, and consequently to reject it. I 
believe, however, that a good case can be made for giving two different accounts, one 
for the experience of continuous changes – the dynamic snapshot theory – and a 
different account for the experience of discontinuous changes. It seems plausible that 
the human brain should detect different kinds of changes in different ways. Given the 
finite nature of human beings, those systems that detect the rate of a continuous 
change must have a threshold beyond which the rate is too quick for the brain to 
measure. It follows that discontinuous changes cannot be detected in the same way. 
But it is nonetheless useful to be able to perceive rates of change in those cases in 
which the rate falls within the measurable range. Many organisms may also have a 
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need to detect discontinuous changes. Consequently it should not seem surprising if 
different kinds of change are detected using different systems. I shall suggest below 
that the empirical evidence weighs in favor of this. Finally, there is arguably a 
significant phenomenological difference between experiences of continuous and 
discontinuous changes. When one perceives a continuous change such as motion 
there is a robust phenomenology associated with the change, as illustrated by Broad’s 
comments about the second hand of the watch. It is robust enough to be 
straightforwardly attended to. But the phenomenology of discontinuous change seems 
far more elusive; by the time there is anything to notice, the change, and the 
experience of it, has already taken place. 
I shall develop a tentative model of discontinuous change perception that will 
initially appear to resemble the cinematic model. In the next section, however, I shall 
argue that the cinematic, retentional and extensional models can only be distinguished 
from one another if a problematic Cartesian assumption is made concerning the 
nature of conscious experience. If that assumption is rejected, as I think it should be, 
then we arrive at a better theory according to which the question of whether 
experience has a temporally extended content should be rejected rather than answered. 
Consider how the human visual system could detect discontinuous changes (I shall 
concentrate on visual examples, but there is no obvious reason why a broadly similar 
story could not be told for other sensory modalities). One very simple model would 
say that all of the perceived information in a scene is retained in some kind of short-
term memory and compared with the scene a moment later. This would require a lot 
of memory capacity, and a lot of information processing. The result would be that any 
change in the visible properties of a scene should be noticed. But this is not the case. 
Studies of change blindness (Rensink, O’Regan and Clark 1997, Simons and Levin 
1997) show that when a change is sufficiently slow, or is masked by a flicker in all or a 
large part of the scene, the subject may fail to notice even quite a large change. 
Consequently most cognitive scientists have rejected the simple model just outlined 
(see Rensink 2002: 260-4 for further details of empirical evidence against the model). 
Instead, the following model has become fairly widely accepted among empirical 
scientists working on change detection (see Rensink 2002 and O’Regan 2002). 
Among other things, the early stages of visual processing detect visual transients, rapid 
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changes in the luminance or color of the retinal image. At the stage of processing at 
which transients are detected, no details of the change itself have yet been computed. 
The function of the detection of the transient appears to be to automatically draw the 
subject’s visual attention to the location of the transient. Ordinarily, where there is no 
attention, experiential information is not retained. One function of attention, however, 
is to cause information concerning the attended location to be briefly retained in a 
short-term memory buffer. This in turn makes it possible to compare the current 
scene with what went immediately before in the region in which the transient was 
detected. Consequently, when a transient draws attention to a location, the subject 
typically notices what has changed at that location. At unattended locations, however, 
a change may be missed, because information about the preceding state at that 
location is discarded before the subject can become aware that anything has changed. 
When changes are slow, no transient is produced; and when there is a flicker, the 
visual system is swamped with transients, making it relatively unlikely that attention 
will be directed to the location at which the change occurs. This is thought to be why 
change blindness occurs. 
This empirical model of change detection fits well with the phenomenology of 
discontinuous change. My hypothesis is that when a transient is detected, this 
produces an element of experience with a content something like “a change has just 
occurred here” or perhaps “a change is occurring here”, where “here” refers to the 
perceived location of the transient. This helps explain the familiar experience of 
noticing a brief change in peripheral vision without being able to say exactly what 
changed. 7 It also, I suggest, accounts for the fact that when one does notice a 
discontinuous change, there is something phenomenological associated with the 
change, but something rather less robust than the phenomenology of continuous 
changes. This is associated with a feeling that the perceived object was in a different 
state a moment before (a state which one may be able to recall). 
Given the appeal to a short-term memory that is compared with current experience, 
the account of the experience of discontinuous change suggested here does have a 
certain amount in common with the cinematic model. Note that the memory in 
                                                
7 There is good independent evidence that change detection (i.e. detecting that there was a change) is 
distinct from change identification (i.e. identifying what changed). See for example Turatto and 
Bridgeman 2005, especially p. 596. 
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question is unlikely to be long-term episodic memory; the case is not like Broad’s 
example of seeing that the hour hand has moved by remembering that it was in a 
different place at an earlier time. In the model under discussion, it is not supposed 
that there is any kind of conscious inference involved. The short-term memory buffer 
in which the earlier state of the object is stored presumably allows a more direct kind 
of comparison. I shall now argue, however, that the distinction between the cinematic, 
extensional and retentional models should itself be rejected, and the theory just 
proposed should be reconstrued accordingly. 
 
 
6. Rejecting Cartesian Qualia 
 
Do the cinematic, retentional and extensional models differ empirically? If they did, 
then it would be an empirical question which, if any, was correct. But it is not clear 
that they do differ empirically. At any rate, each seems committed to the following 
claims about the information processing involved when someone perceives a change 
and reports on it. For simplicity, consider a simple discontinuous change, as described 
above: an object is red at all times up to and including t, and green at all times 
thereafter. Each theory must acknowledge that firstly information must be received to 
the effect that the object is red, and that this information must still be present in the 
brain when it subsequently detects that the object is green. These two pieces of 
information then interact to produce a verbal report to the effect that the object 
changed from red to green. According to the cinematic model the information is 
retained as a short-term memory, which is compared with current experience. 
According to the retentional model, the information that the object was red at times 
up to t is retained and combined with the information that the object was green 
thereafter to produce an experience whose content is that the object changed from red 
to green. The experience of the change then produces the verbal report. Finally, the 
extensional theory holds that the object is experienced as red, then experienced as 
green, and the temporally extended experience that encompasses both states is an 
 13 
experience of the object changing from red to green.8 Again, this temporally extended 
experience somehow leads to the verbal report, though in order to do so some trace of 
the “red” experience must be retained for long enough to influence the report.9 
So, on the face of it, all three theories tell much the same story about information 
processing; they all agree that information about the “red” state of the object must be 
retained and combined with information about the “green” state in order to produce 
the verbal report that the object changed from red to green. At any rate, I shall take it 
as a working hypothesis that all of these theories tell the same story about the way 
information is processed during the perception of discontinuous change. If this turns 
out to be incorrect then it should be possible, in principle, to rule out at least one 
theory on empirical grounds. But let us suppose that this is not so; the theories are 
empirically equivalent. The difference between them, then, seems to consist entirely 
in what they say about conscious experiences. Given a flow diagram of the 
information processing that is involved in experiencing discontinuous change, the 
difference between the theories will amount to differences in which parts of the 
diagram should be designated as constituting (or causing) conscious experiences, and 
which should be designated as memories.10 To put this another way, the difference 
will consist in where the qualia appear in the diagram. 
This assumes that there are such things are qualia. Daniel Dennett (1988; 1991) 
has argued, however, that qualia, as commonly construed, are a myth (he does not, of 
course, deny that there are conscious experiences in some broad sense, or that there is 
“something that it is like” to have a conscious mind). The notion of qualia to which 
Dennett is opposed says that qualia are ineffable, intrinsic, private and directly or 
immediately apprehensible. This, for Dennett, is associated with the notion of the 
mind as a Cartesian theatre, where the qualia are like actors on a stage, appearing 
before an audience (the “self”), such that the qualia enter and leave the stage at a 
definite time, and there are definite facts about such matters as what counts as the 
cessation of the conscious experience and the beginning of the reaction to it. 
                                                
8 It is not clear to me what makes it the case that the temporal stages of the experience are parts of a 
unified experience, on the extensional model, or how this would account for the phenomenology. See 
Prosser 2016: 143-8 for details. 
9 Lee (2014) raises a similar point as an objection to the extensional model; see his discussion of the 
“trace integration” argument. 
10 See Prosser 2016: 156-7 for diagrams of this kind. 
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I shall not rehearse Dennett’s arguments here. But if his characterization of the 
problematic assumption is even roughly right (and we need not accept every detail of 
his description of the putative qualia to think so), then it is not clear that the 
distinction between the three main models of temporal experience can be sustained. 
Let us start by considering the difference between the cinematic and retentional 
models. Suppose that a change from A to B is experienced. The former theory says 
that change is experienced because a current perception of A is combined with a very 
recent short-term memory of B; the latter says that change is experienced because a 
single experience has the content that A is followed by B. Provided we restrict 
attention to discontinuous changes, is there any way that introspection could tell us 
which of these theories was correct? How would we know what to look for? It does 
not seem at all clear that we have any capacity to distinguish, introspectively, between 
the different models. Indeed if both models agree on all matters of information 
processing, as I suggested above, then both models should predict exactly the same 
verbal reports of conscious experiences. If we then compare either of these two models 
with the extensional model, we find exactly the same situation: introspection cannot, 
and should not, be able to settle which model is correct.11 
It will nevertheless seem to many people that there has to be an answer. The three 
models disagree concerning when the various experiences occur, or when a given 
experience begins and ends. According to the cinematic and extensional models, the 
subject experiences A, then experiences B. But according to the cinematic model this 
consists in a sequence of independent snapshot experiences, whereas according to the 
extensional model it is a single experience that takes time to occur. According to the 
retentional model, A and B both belong to the content of a single experience, with no 
sense to be made of the claim that the experience of A precedes the experience of B. 
All of this makes sense only if it is assumed that a conscious experience begins and 
ends at a precise, determinate moment in time – that incoming information crosses a 
“finish line” at some determinate point and thereby enters consciousness, and then 
exits at a similarly determinate moment. This is very much the notion of the 
                                                
11 Phillips (2014) does suggest that introspection favors extensionalism, but his argument for this 
interpolates from long-term to short-term experience in a way that strikes me as problematic. See 
Prosser 2016: 143-6 for discussion. However Phillips (2010) does also briefly express some doubts, not 
entirely dissimilar to those expressed here, about how much of a difference there really is between the 
main competing theories. 
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Cartesian theatre; a given actor (i.e. a quale) is either on the stage or is not, and must 
enter and leave the stage at determinate moments in time. If one accepts this, then 
one must hold that one of the three theories of temporal experience is correct. But 
why must we accept it? Presumably it is part of an implicit theory that has qualia as 
part of its ontology. If we reject the theory, we may also reject the ontology. I suggest 
that we have no good reason to accept this theory. It entails that there are facts about 
matters about which we have no reason to believe that there are facts. The three 
models do not differ in what they say about information processing, or in what they 
say about introspection (or so I am assuming). So there is no observation, of any kind, 
that could determine which was correct. 
Most philosophers these days hold that we should not, in general, reject 
ontological claims for purely verificationist reasons. It is not always the case that if we 
cannot detect the difference empirically, then it is meaningless to suppose that there is 
a difference. But conscious experience may be an exception to this. Qualia are 
supposed to be properties of experiences whose whole essence is to determine “what it 
is like” for the subject who has the experience. But can there be facts about what it is 
like that transcend one’s ability to introspect, even in principle? The issue is not 
whether introspection is an infallible guide to conscious experience. Clearly it is not; 
there are many examples that show that subjects can make mistaken judgments about 
their conscious experiences. But to say that introspective error is possible is one thing; 
it is quite another thing to claim that there could be intelligible differences in the way 
we model conscious experiences, such as those described above, such that it would be 
impossible in principle for introspection ever to discern which model was correct. 
When it comes to conscious experience, if we cannot tell the difference, even in 
principle, then we should be deeply suspicious of the claim that there really is a 
difference. 
Perhaps there could be some kind of a priori argument that would show one theory 
to account for experience better than another. Perhaps one or more of the models 
could be shown to be internally inconsistent, or problematic in some other way. I 
cannot rule this out. But the anti-Cartesian considerations described above suggest 
that we should consider another possibility: that the issue over which the cinematic 
theorists, retentional theorists and extensional theorists are disagreeing is entirely 
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chimerical. If we relax the assumption that there is a definite moment at which 
information “enters” or “leaves” consciousness, or that a conscious experience starts 
and ends at determinate moments in time, then we can describe temporal experience 
in a different way. Perhaps we might think of the question of when information 
enters consciousness as comparable to the question of when exactly some information 
has been received by a large organization such as the BBC. The information might 
reach different parts of the organization at different times, with no principled reason 
to pick one of them as more important than the others. Following this line of thought, 
we might eschew the notion of an experience and say instead, for example, that there 
are long periods during which a subject is experiencing the world, and that during 
such a period – a period that does not start at a precise, determinate instant – the 
subject becomes aware that A is followed by B, which is followed, by C, and so on. 
There is indeed something that it is like for the subject during that episode of 
conscious experience, but what it is like is perhaps exhausted by what the subject 
experiences (the various events, and the sequence in which they occur). There need be 
nothing more to say than that. 
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